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NOTES
Oil and Gas Proration Formulas, for Small Tracts:
Compulsory Pooling in Texas?
Appellee applied to the Texas Railroad Commission for a permit
to drill a first gas well on its .3-acre tract under an exception to the
well spacing rule. Appellee alleged that denial of the permit would
result in confiscation of minerals underlying its land through drain-
age to wells on surrounding tracts. Appellant opposed the granting
of the permit, alleging that under the rules adopted for the field
very substantial uncompensated drainage would take place from
under appellant's and other surrounding tracts to appellee's proposed
well. The field rules included a 320-acre well spacing pattern and
an allocation formula distributing the field allowable to the operators
!/ among the wells and 2/ according to the acreage in the field. The
Railroad Commission granted the drilling permit and was upheld by
the district court. Held, reversed: Absent special considerations, an
allocation formula which will result in substantial uncompensated
drainage of gas from surrounding tracts is an unreasonable basis
upon which to prorate production. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Railroad
Comm'n, - Tex. -, 346 S.W.2d 801 (1961).
Ownership of oil and gas presents special problems which cannot
be dealt with in terms of ordinary property law due to the unique
migratory properties of these minerals.' Texas has adopted the theory
of ownership in place, which declares that underlying minerals are
owned by the person under whose land they lie, for the time they
tarry there.! Before conservation statutes modified the case law, this
ownership theory was limited by the "rule of capture."3 This rule
recognized ownership in place but declared that one acquired title
to all the minerals he could produce, though they might have
migrated from under another's land.4 An adjoining landowner had no
recourse to the courts to prevent this uncompensated drainage, but
could only "go and do likewise,"' usually producing a race to drill
as many wells as was economically feasible.! Thus, one could recover
1 See Westmoreland Cambria Nat. Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, 18 Atl. 724 (1889).
2Marrs v. Railroad Comm'n, 142 Tex. 293, 177 S.W.2d 941, 948 (1944); Brown v.
Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 126 Tex. 296, 83 S.W.2d 935 (1935).
SJaphet v. McRae, 276 S.W. 669, 672 (Tex. Com. App. 1925).
4Ryan Consol. Petroleum Corp. v. Pickens, 155 Tex. 221, 285 S.W.2d 201, 207 (1956);
Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W.2d 558, 561 (1948); see Barnard v.
Monongahela Nat. Gas Co., 216 Pa. 362, 65 Atl. 801, 802 (1907).
'Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 126 Tex. 296, 83 S.W.2d 935, 940 (1935).
6"[W]e find an unrestricted race, the prize being the oil and gas under both tracts.
The result is great physical waste of oil and gas, as well as the economic waste that flows
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oil and gas in excess of that underlying his land through uncompen-
sated drainage from under surrounding tracts, the quantity depend-
ing on how fast the wells would flow. To remedy the often chaotic
and wasteful conditions resulting from this extreme individualism,
conservation statutes were enacted which sought not only to prevent
waste of irreplaceable natural resources in the public interest, but
also to adjust and protect "correlative rights" between landowners.'
These statutes, varying in scope in various jurisdictions,' have been
upheld as a valid exercise of the police power of the state for both
purposes.! Necessarily, both the law of ownership in place'" and the
rule of capture" had to give way to the extent inconsistent with
these statutes. In Texas, the Railroad Commission has been delegated
broad discretionary powers to administer the conservation statutes
by adopting rules and orders governing the drilling and production
of oil and gas." After early difficulties, 3 the federal courts recognized
the constitutionality of production quotas based upon market de-
mand and capacity to produce as well as prevention of physical
waste.14 Also, as a reasonable exercise of police power to prevent waste
from the drilling of unnecessary wells." Meyers, The Law of Pooling and Unitization 20
(1957).
"E.g., Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6008 (1949).
8 The simpler and basic forms of conservation are well-spacing, whereby wells can be
drilled only at certain intervals and at prescribed distances from property lines, and pro-
ration, which limits the rate of flow in an effort to match market demand.
Pooling and unitization are contractual arrangements whereby maximum efficiency and
minimum expense are the objectives. These are described in Meyers, ob. cit supra note 6, at 1:
The consolidation of oil and gas leases or other mineral interests in a field of
common source of supply .. . is generally referred to as "unitization" as
distinguished from the word pooling, which is applied to such interests
covering comparatively small tracts. Typical of this latter is the consolidation
of separately owned mineral interests to form a drilling or proration unit.
The statutes authorizing these agreements may provide for compulsory as well as voluntary
pooling. Texas and Kansas are the only two significant oil-producing states without com-
pulsory pooling.
'Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573 (1940); Ohio Oil Co.
v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900).
Corzelius v. Harrell, 179 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944-Austin) error granted,
dism. as moot, 143 Tex. 509, 186 S.W.2d 961 (1945), was the first Texas case expressly
holding that adjustment of correlative rights was a proper constitutional function, not
depending on the existence of waste. See Note, 24 Texas L. Rev. 97 (1945).
'"Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 126 Tex. 296, 83 S.W.2d 935, 940 (1935).
11 See Henderson v. Terrell, 24 F. Supp. 147, 153 (W.D. Tex. 1938); Corzelius v.
Harrell, 179 S.W.2d 419, 425 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944-Austin) error granted, dism. as
moot, 143 Tex. 509, 186 S.W.2d 961 (1945).
laTex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6049c (1949).
"a In Macmillan v. Railroad Comm'n, 51 F.2d 400 (W.D. Tex. 1931), the federal district
court held proration orders of the Commission invalid because based on market demand and
not on prevention of physical waste, and because allegedly designed for fixing prices and
preventing economic waste, contrary to applicable statutes. See Hardwicke, Legal History of
Proration of Oil Production in Texas, 56 Texas L. Rev. B.A. No. 99, 109 (1937).
14 Oklahoma's market demand statute was upheld in Champlain Ref. Co. v. Oklahoma
Corp. Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210 (1932). Rulings of the Texas Railroad Commission on this
matter were upheld in Amazon Petroleum Corp. v. Railroad Comm'n, 5 F. Supp. 633 (E.D.
Tex. 1934).
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and hazardous conditions, the courts sustained the requirement that
wells in the field can be drilled only according to the spacing pattern
set by the Commission." However, the practice of granting excep-
tions to the spacing rules "to prevent confiscation" of the minerals
underlying small or irregularly shaped tracts has produced a great
deal of controversy and litigation in Texas.1" This policy is especially
significant in Texas since there is no compulsory pooling statute,
and the courts and the Commission have not required an applicant
for a drilling permit under an exception to Rule 37 to show he has
been unable to pool as a part of proof of prospective confiscation of
his minerals.'
The Texas statutes delegate to the Railroad Commission the
authority to prevent waste and protect correlative rights in the gas
fields of the state,'" to prorate production on a reasonable basis,9
and to give each well its fair share of the gas in the reservoir.' The
Texas Supreme Court has charged the Commission to give each
person only his "fair share" of the oil and gas in a reservoir, which
is defined as that substantially equivalent to the recoverable oil and
gas underlying his tract." Indeed, the performance of this duty
would seem to be clearly directed as the necessary implementation
of the prevailing doctrine of ownership in place. However, no little
confusion has resulted from the tendencies of the Railroad Com-
mission, with the usual acquiescence of the courts, to grant excep-
tions to Rule 37 as a matter of course and to set allowables with
significant well factors." The usual result is, of course, that a small
tract operator is allowed to recover minerals in excess of those under-
lying his land. These practices have been at the expense of the orderly
"Oxford Oil Co. v. Atlantic Oil & Prod. Co., 16 F.2d 639 (5th Cir. 1927),
cert. denied, 277 U.S. 585 (1928); Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 126 Tex. 296, 83
S.W.2d 935, 941 (1935).
'" The Texas well-spacing rule of 1919, numbered "37," was the first in the United States.
For convenience, "Rule 37" has been used to refer to all well-spacing regulations promul-
gated since that time. A "Rule 37 case" is one involving a well-spacing order by the Com-
mission. An exception permitting wells on tracts smaller than set out in the general rule
was first provided in 1921 and has been carried up to the present. It is this exception
which saves the rule from attack on constitutional grounds as being confiscatory. See Hard-
wicke, Oil-Well Spacing Regulations and Protection of Property Rights in Texas, 31 Texas
L. Rev. 99, 102 (1952); Meyers, op. cit. supra note 6, at 11.
" Compare Hardwicke, supra note 16, at 120-22.
1 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6008, § 10 (1949).
'o Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6008, § 12 (1949).
' Ibid.
" E.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Gulf Prod. Co., 134 Tex. 122, 132 S.W.2d 254, 255 (1939);
Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 134 Tex. 59, 131 S.W.2d 73 (1939); Brown v. Humble
Oil & Ref. Co., 126 Tex. 296, 83 S.W.2d 935, 944 (1935).
"See generally Meyers, op. cit. supra note 6, at 111-18, concerning problems created by
the granting of exceptions and setting of excessive allowables, and reasons why the Commis-
sion has carried on these policies.
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development of the oil and gas fields of the state which should result
from an adherence to the fair share idea and the doctrine of owner-
ship in place." An owner of a tract which does not contain the
requisite number of acres to qualify for a well under the spacing
rules for a particular field has been able to obtain a permit to drill
from the Commission as a matter of course. The justification given
for allowing the well is to prevent confiscation of underlying min-
erals." Some Texas cases have stated that a tract is entitled to a
first well as a matter of law, regardless of size." The tract, however,
must not have been created from a "voluntary subdivision" of a
larger tract subsequent to the application of the spacing rules to the
field." Once a small tract operator is given a drilling permit, some
cases have said he is entitled to make a profit over and above the
costs of drilling and producing, necessitating a production allow-
able so weighted with a substantial well factor as to insure this
profit." This practice is seemingly in contradiction with the statute
creating the authority of the Commission and the decisions pro-
nouncing the fair share doctrine,"0 but the courts have refused to
dictate formulas to be used by the Railroad Commission in allocating
production."2 However, for an abuse of discretion-a finding that
2 See C. Sidney McClain, End of an Era-Small Tract Version 6, Address before
Mineral Law Section, 1961 Texas Bar Convention (July 1961), reported in 24 Tex. B.J.
727 (1961). In discussing these practices, McClain cited the case of Halbouty v. Darsey,
326 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959-Austin) error ref. n.r.e., as an example of an attitude
the courts have sometimes taken: "This decision contained the statement that the Commission
could not violate vested rights in seeing that oil and gas fields were developed in an
orderly and scientific manner." The words "vested rights" were used to describe the
"rights" flowing from the rule of capture.
24 See discussion in note 16 supra.
21 Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 126 Tex. 296, 83 S.W.2d 935 (1935); Stanolind
Oil & Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 96 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936-Austin) no
writ hist.2
'E.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 151 Tex. 51, 245 S.W.2d 488, 490
(1952); Brown v. Hitchcock, 235 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950-Austin) error ref.
In discussing the origin of this rule, Hardwicke, supra note 16, at 108 said:
Apparently it is based primarily on the addition to Rule 37, effective May
29, 1934, providing that no exception to prevent confiscation would be granted
with respect to a tract carved from a larger tract "if such subdivision took
place subsequent to the promulgation and adoption of the original spacing
rule."
27 Railroad Comm'n v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 193 S.W.2d 824, 832 (Tex. Civ. App.
1946-Austin) error ref. n.r.e. Hardwicke. supra note 18, at 117, says the idea of a right
to a profit can be traced to a dictum in the Humble case, supra, which he considers to be
unsound.
2 A field allowable is usually divided partially, e.g., Y2 in the case of oil, and Y/ in
the case of gas, among all the wells in the field, with the remainder allocated on an acreage
basis. Thus, a small tract with a producing well will be enabled to produce considerably
more oil or gas per acre than a well on a larger tract, and make a profit over expenses, if
there is a substantial (!/3 or more) well factor included in the allocation formula.
9 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6008, § 12 (1949).
0 Cases cited note 21 supra.
3' 346 S.W.2d at 812.
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there is no substantial evidence to support an order-a court will
reverse the Commission." As a justification for allowing production
greatly disproportionate to acreage with the accompanying uncom-
pensated drainage from under surrounding tracts, the courts have in-
voked the rule of capture." The reasoning has been that the rule of
capture, allowing one to keep what he has legally produced, authorizes
the prospective uncompensated drainage to a well on a small tract
operating under an allowable so weighted as to allow a profit. 4 The
result has been that voluntary pooling of small tracts in a proven field
has been greatly discouraged since one may simply refuse to pool,
allege confiscation, get a drilling permit under an exception to Rule
37, and proceed to realize far greater net income by operating under
a generous allowable formula."
In an attempt to overturn a Railroad Commission order which
would have allowed this result, the appellant brought the principal
case to the Texas Supreme Court on direct appeal from the district
court as authorized by statute." The district court had held the
order of the Railroad Commission granting a drilling permit as an
exception to Rule 37 was based on substantial evidence, 7 citing Ryan
Consol. Petroleum Corp. v. Pickens3 and its rule of capture doctrine
as controlling.3" The supreme court reversed, holding there was no
substantial evidence justifying such a wide discrepancy in the rate
of production as would result from the order of the Commission.4
Specifically, the !3-% allocation formula was declared an unreason-
able basis upon which to prorate gas production from the Normanna
Field.41 The appellant's evidence was apparently adopted as sub-
stantially correct. This evidence showed that if the Commission's
order were sustained, over the life of the field the appellee would be
32 Trapp v. Shell Oil Co., 145 Tex. 323, 198 S.W.2d 424, 441 (1946); Railroad Comm'n
v. Shell Oil Co., 139 Tex. 66, 161 S.W.2d 1022, 1029 (1942). In these cases the court
emphasized that the important point is not whether the Commission's decision was proper,
but whether it was arbitrary and without regard to the facts.
aaHalbouty v. Darsey, 326 S.W.2d 528, 532 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959-Austin) error ref.
n.r.e.; Railroad Comm'n v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 193 S.W.2d 824, 832 (Tex. Civ. App.
1946-Austin) error ref. n.r.e.
"'The late cases rely on Ryan Consol. Petroleum Corp. v. Pickens, 155 Tex. 221, 285
S.W.2d 201 (1955), as authority.
"'In Railroad Comm'n v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 193 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App.
1946-Austin) error ref. n.r.e., the court upheld a drilling permit for a .1 acre tract under
a 50-50 allowable formula. The amount a .1 acre tract would receive under a pooling agree-
ment would be negligible in proportion to the amount produced under such special treatment.
3 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1738a (1945); Tex. R. Civ. P. 499(a).
37 346 S.W.2d at 803.
8155 Tex. 221, 285 S.W.2d 201 (1956).
' 346 S.W.2d at 803.
4o346 S.W.2d at 811.
41 Ibid.
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allowed to produce in excess of two and one-half million dollars
worth of gas from its proposed well.42 Appellee's tract contained
something less than .3 acres, with the underlying reserves valued at
about 7,000 dollars, according to appellant's evidence. The court
held that Ryan v. Pickens was not authority for the trial court's
holding because it was not a proration case.43 The rule of capture
was held not in point concerning prospective drainage as would occur
were the Commission's order sustained in the principal case." The
court emphasized that the cases voicing the fair share doctrine meant
what they said-that one is entitled to recover only the approximate
amount of minerals underlying his land." Two earlier important
cases were distinguished, and a limitation of the fair share doctrine
recognized, by the court's acknowledgment that where operators in
a field have long acquiesced in the existing field rules they should
not be heard to complain." Expressly rejected was appellee's con-
tention that a small tract's rights should be measured by what it
could have produced before conservation statutes were enacted."
Moreover, the court did not close its eyes, as the Commission and
courts have often done in the past, to the substantial inequities that
have resulted from the headlong rush to allow exceptions to Rule 37
"to prevent confiscation," with the accompanying allowables designed
to allow a profit. The court did not merely see the possible confisca-
tion of the minerals underlying appellee's small tract but recognized
the equally significant and certain confiscation which would have
resulted from uncompensated drainage from under the surround-
ing land of appellant and others to appellee's proposed well. Upon
the court's denial of motion for rehearing, two justices dissented.
42 346 S.W.2d at 804.
43 346 S.W.2d at 810. The court pointed out that the Ryan case was a suit for an equit-
able claim on minerals already produced from a well on a well-spacing unit composed in
part of mineral lands of a non-well owner. It agreed that the Ryan case would apply in
the present case if the court had earlier sustained the V-2/3 proration formula and
appellant had been suing for the value of minerals drained from under its land by appellee.
The court put the rule of capture in its proper place by stating, 346 S.W.2d at 810:
It was the application of Rule 37 which gave Pickens . . . the right to
produce ...and not the rule of capture. It was, however, the rule of capture
which prevented Ryan from collecting damages .. . for the oil drained from
under Ryan's lots.
44346 S.W.2d at 810. This implicitly discredits the cases applying rule of capture
reasoning to sustain the validity of proration formulas allowing substantial uncompensated
drainage to a well drilled as an exception to Rule 37.
4' 346 S.W.2d at 808, 809. McClain, supra note 23, at 7, said concerning this case:
"The dominant theme of the decision is 'fair share', with those words or words of similar
context appearing in the opinion more than twenty times."
46346 S.W.2d at 811.
47346 S.W.2d at 811. Appellee's contention assumes that adjoining landowners have
the right to "go and do likewise" by drilling additional wells to offset drainage to a well
on a small tract. This right does not, of course, exist under Rule 37 or most present day
conservation statutes.
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They saw in the majority opinion an attempt to compel appellee to
pool" with adjoining landowners in order to recover his underlying
minerals, contrary to Texas statutory and case law. 9 These justices
felt that Ryan v. Pickens and the rule of capture were controlling"
despite the inequities presented in this case. The majority opinion
was also said to be a departure from established precedent concerning
procedures governing review of Commission orders."'
The court in the principal case declared the order of the Com-
mission invalid but did not attempt to set an allocation formula,
recognizing that to do so would be an illegal interference with the
discretion reposed in the Commission. 5 The Commission responded
with a radically revised allocation formula in the new rules for the
Normanna Field" which allocated production among the operators
in the field on a 100 per cent acreage basis. Under the new rules an
operator having the right to drill upon a tract containing less than
100 acres is given a measure of relief by a proviso allowing the Com-
mission to grant him a special allowable. To qualify for this, however,
he must prove that drilling a well is not economically feasible under
the existing allowable and that adjoining landowners have refused
to pool on a reasonable basis, which is stated to be a 100 per cent
acreage basis. The proviso also limits the special allowable to no
more than that set for a tract of 100 productive acres."
" The dissenting judge used the word "unitize" instead of "pool." Unitization is gen-
erally used to describe consolidation of leases in an entire field, and is inaccurate for the
smaller area involved in this case. Meyers, op. cit. supra note 6, at 1; see discussion in note
8 supra.
49 346 S.W.2d at 814: "It is well established that there can be no compulsory unitization
in Texas. To grant the injunction in the present case would practically effect unitization."
50 346 S.W.2d at 815-17. But in quoting an historical analysis from Ralph B. Shank,
Present Status of Law of Capture, Sw. Leg. Found. 6th Inst. on Oil & Gas L. and Tax. 257,
272 (1955), the dissent shows its outmoded view of the law of capture: "The correlative
right to the law of capture was [not is] the law of capture." (Emphasis added.) This
quotation only serves to point out that, historically, the remedy of an adjoining landowner
for drainage was his right to drill as many wells and pump as much oil and gas as was
possible. Under conservation statutes this "remedy" is sharply limited, and serves as no
justification for allowing uncompensated drainage to a small tract well.
The dissent draws strength from a quotation from Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co.,
126 Tex. 296, 83 S.W.2d 935, 940 (1935): "And it [the law of capture] is limited only
by the physical possibility of the adjoining landowner diminishing the oil and gas under
one's land by the exercise of the same right of capture." Note, however, the date of the
case.
as 346 S.W.2d at 820: "The opinion of the majority constitutes a departure from the well-
established rules of procedure as laid down by the statutes governing the Commission in
adopting field rules."
'2 346 S.W.2d at 812. However, the court made clear the duty of the Commission: "The
responsibility rests with the Commission to devise some rule of proration which will con-
serve the gas in the field in question and at the same time be fair and just to all parties
without depriving any of them of his property."
"2 Special Order No. 2-46673, Tex. R.R. Comm'n R. & Regs., § 7, at 917, 14 Oil &
Gas Rep. 885 (1961).
"The Commission explained its position in its remarks preliminary to setting out the
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The principal case may well have a revolutionary effect on the
future of small tract oil and gas operations.5 It has already been cited
as controlling in one Texas Supreme Court case5" and seems to have
initiated a trend in Texas oil and gas law." This trend at last takes
a realistic look at the conditions which have resulted in the past from
a liberal granting of exceptions to Rule 37 using an allowable
formula with a significant well factor. Under the rules for the
Normanna Field, containing the 100 per cent acreage allocation
formula, a drilling permit under an exception to Rule 37, assuming
it is granted, will frequently be an illusory right due to the high
costs of drilling and operation on a small tract as compared with
the amount of minerals that can be legally recovered under such a
formula. This case and resulting order seem to mean that the "right
to a profit" doctrine is dead except where a small tract owner can
show he has been refused pooling on a reasonable basis by adjacent
owners of mineral operating rights. The relief afforded by the
proviso to the 100 per cent acreage allocation formula will protect
the formula from charges of confiscation, while in practice it rarely
revised rules, id. at 917, 14 Oil & Gas Rep. at 886:
[S]uch solution in all probability is best resolved through the use of a special
allowable that would encourage a small tract owner to negotiate with his neigh-
bors for fair and just treatment, but would also provide a sufficient allowable
to such small tract to encourage a reasonable attitude in such neighbors so
that they would endeavor to work out this common problem ....
5 Though the holding concerns a gas pool, and applies to only the Normanna Field,
there is little doubt that policies affecting the oil fields of the state will also undergo a
similar change. In oil fields the most usual allocation formula has been 507o wells and
50% acreage-at least as objectionable under the court's reasoning as the V3 wells-%
acreage formula condemned in the instant case.
5' Halbouty v. Railroad Comm'n, - Tex. S.W.2d -, 5 Tex. Sup. Ct.
Journal 246 (1962). On similar facts, except that 40 small tract owners had been given
permits to drill, as compared with one in the instant case, the court held that a Y-%
gas allocation formula was invalid because not affording an opportunity to all of the parties
to produce and save their fair share of the minerals in the common reservoir. Uncompensated
drainage was said not authorized except "when no other means of recovering the minerals
which underlie . . . [the] . . . land are available." 5 Tex. Sup. Ct. Journal at 254.
(Emphasis added.)
Some months after the instant case, the court in Railroad Comm'n v. Williams,
- Tex. - 356 S.W.2d 131 (1962), held that a small tract was not necessarily
entitled to a first well. Contrary to language in earlier cases, the court said the
right to drill a well is not something vested in the tract of land, but pertains to
the need of an owner for a well to prevent confiscation. The opinion seems to indicate that
if a small tract has. ever been in an ownership that was receiving its "fair share" from
other wells in the same pool, no subsequent owner would be entitled to a well in the tract.
Out of step with the "trend" is a recent civil appeals decision, Coloma Oil & Gas Corp.
v. Railroad Comm'n, 348 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961-Austin) error granted.
The court, in sustaining a Commission order granting a permit to drill, held that
the fact of common ownership of two close but non-contiguous tracts could not be
taken into consideration in action on an application for a permit to drill a well on one as
an exception to Rule 37, where there was a producing well on the other. Non-contiguity
appears to be the only element which could distinguish this case from Railroad Comm'n v.
Williams, supra.
